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Transfer Between Courts Under the Indiana
Juvenile Code
ROBERT BATEY*
The Indiana Juvenile Code,1 proposed by the Juvenile Justice Division
of the Indiana Judicial Study Commission in 1977 and adopted by the
state legislature in 1978,2 becomes effective on October 1, 1979.3 In the
words of the Juvenile Justice Division, the General Assembly delayed
the Code's effective date "to allow for more public input."
4
This delay for public comment and criticism is particularly appropriate
because of the nationwide attention currently being focused on the
juvenile justice system by the work of the Juvenile Justice Standards
Project. The Project, a joint effort of the Institute of Judicial Ad-
ministration and the American Bar Association throughout the 1970's,
5
promulgated standards "cover[ing] the entire field of juvenile justice ad-
ministration" which are "intended to serve as guidelines for action by
legislators, judges, administrators ... and others responsible for or con-
cerned with the treatment of youths .... 7
In the interim between the Indiana Juvenile Code's enactment and its
effective date, those "concerned with the treatment of youths" in In-
diana ought to compare the Code's provisions with the proposals of the
Juvenile Justice Standards Project. This article makes such a com-
parison with respect to one isolated but significant topic, the transfer of a
juvenile to criminal court for prosecution as an adult. The Code's provi-
sions on transfer in relation to the Project's proposals are first analyzed.
*Associate Professor, Stetson University College of Law. B.A. 1970, Yale University;
J.D. 1974, University of Virginia; LL.M. 1976, University of Illinois. As a third-year law
student, the author served as research assistant to Professor Charles H. Whitebread,
Reporter on Transfer Between Courts to the Juvenile Justice Standards Project. Professor
Whitebread bears no responsibility for any of the views expressed in this article. The
author wishes to acknowledge his gratitude to Charles Whitebread and to three of his
research assistants at Stetson University College of Law: William G. Berzak, Sara M.
Fotopulos and Elvin W. Phillips.
The article was completed prior to enactment of the 1979 Amendments to the Juvenile
Code, which incorporated some recommendations of this article. Editor's notes will in-
dicate such changes.
'IND. CODE §§ 31-6-1-1 to 31-6-10-4 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
2Act of March 10, 1978, Pub. L. No. 136, 1978 Ind. Acts 1196 (to be codified as IND. CODE
§§ 31-6-1-1 to 31-6-10-4).3ICL § 59.
'JUVENILE JUSTICE DIVISION. INDIANA JUDICIAL STUDY COMMISSION, PROPOSED AMEND-
MENTS TO THE INDIANA JUVENILE CODE iV (1978).
IIJA-ABA JOINT COMMISSION ON JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, TRANSFER BETWEEN
COURTS v-vi (Tent. Draft, 1977) [hereinafter cited as TRANSFER STANDARDS].
I1d. at v.
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making recommendations for amendment of the Indiana Juvenile Code.
The article then addresses a question overlooked both in the passage of
the Indiana Juvenile Code and in the formulation of the Project's stan-
dards on transfer between courts: what should be the post-transfer status
of a juvenile's pre-transfer confession? Due to the importance of this
question, the article proposes both judicial and legislative additions to
the Indiana Juvenile Code.
INDIANA TRANSFER PROVISIONS
The first step in creating a juvenile court system is to limit severely the
criminal courts' jurisdiction over the acts of minors. The Indiana
Juvenile Code takes this step by granting the juvenile courts "exclusive
original jurisdiction" over any child alleged to have committed a delin-
quent act;8 a delinquent act is any act committed before the juvenile's
eighteenth birthday which "would be a crime if committed by an adult."9
The Code emphasizes this exclusive original jurisdiction in the juvenile
court by directing that any original criminal proceedings cease im-
mediately upon a determination that the defendant falls within the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court.10
These provisions exactly parallel the recommendations of the Juvenile
Justice Standards Project. The transfer standards advocate exclusive
original jurisdiction in the juvenile court over "any person whose alleged
conduct would constitute an offense ... if at the time the offense is al-
leged to have occurred such person was not more than seventeen years of
age."11 Thus, the Code and the standards agree that the upper limit of
juvenile court jurisdiction should be the juvenile's eighteenth birthday
and that the appropriate point at which to measure age for jurisdictional
purposes is the time of the commission of the allegedly delinquent act.12
The Indiana Juvenile Code, like the transfer standards, does allow non-
original criminal court jurisdiction over the acts of a child. If the juvenile
court "waives [its] jurisdiction,' 3 trial and conviction in a criminal court
8IND. CODE § 31-6-2-1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979).9Id. § 31-6-4-1(a)(1). There are a few exceptions to this definition of "delinquent act": the
juvenile court has no jurisdiction over a child who violates any law regarding the use of
automobiles (when the child is at least 16 years of age), snowmobiles, and watercraft or any
law "protecting fish or wildlife." I& § 31-6-2-1(b).
llId § 31-6-2-2(a). The only step a criminal court may take after making such a deter-
mination is to seek extradition of a fleeing juvenile accused of a felony. Id § 31-6-2-1(e).
Upon extradition, the child must be sent to the juvenile court. Id. § 31-6-2-2(b).
"TRANSFER STANDARDS § 1.1(A). Section 1.1(A) recommends original jurisdiction in the
juvenile court. Sections 1.1(B) and 1.1(C) make that jurisdiction exclusive by prohibiting
the criminal courts from exercising original jurisdiction over juveniles while permitting the
exercise of non-original jurisdiction. Id § 1.1(B), 1.1(C).
'"For a defense of both positions, see id. § 1.1(A) commentary.
"IND. CODE § 31-6-2-4(a)(Cum. Supp. 1979). The Code speaks consistently of "waiver" of
jurisdiction by the juvenile court, rather than "transfer" of the juvenile to the criminal
court. Because this "waiver" label is easily confused with the label given the problem of a
juvenile's waiver of rights, see id § 31-6-7-3, the term "transfer" will be used in this article.
[Vol. 54:577
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become possible. 14 This provision for transfer to criminal court has ob-
vious significance for the juvenile.
It would of course be theoretically possible to establish a juvenile court
without making any provision for transfer. However, as the Juvenile
Justice Standards Project recognizes, the no-transfer goal is an
unrealistic one, due to the public pressure for transfer that individual
cases can generate. 5 Thus, the Project recommends some provision for
transfer, 6 while adding that transfer should occur only rarely. 7
The means by which the standards attempt to effect this limitation are
substantive and procedural. restrictions on the transfer process.18 With
respect to these restrictions, the standards and the Indiana Juvenile
Code begin to diverge significantly,19 suggesting that thd Indiana
General Assembly is less committed than the Juvenile Justice Standards
Project to the proposition that transfer should occur only infrequently.
The transfer standards recommend several substantive limits on
transfer: (1) the juvenile must have been sixteen or seventeen years of age
"Id. § 31-6-3-5(a).
"See TRANSFER STANDARDS § 1.1(C) commentary. The commentary uses as an example
New York's no-transfer scheme. In that state, criminal court jurisdiction over a delinquent
was not possible, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 712 (McKinney Supp. 1978); id. § 713 (McKinney
1975). However, "delinquent" was defined to include only those 15 years of age or younger
at the time of the alleged delinquency. Id. § 712(a) (McKinney Supp. 1978). The implication
is that the demand for criminal prosecution of some young offenders, which demand
transfer of jurisdiction would ordinarily satisfy, resulted instead in a lowering of the upper
limit of juvenile court jurisdiction. For an elaboration of this argument, see Whitebread &
Batey, Transfer Between Courts: Proposals of the Juvenile Justice Standards Projec 63
VA. L. REV. 221, 235-38 (1977).
'
6
TRANSFER STANDARDS § 1.1(C).
,
7
"Only extraordinary juveniles in extraordinary factual situations should be transferred
to the criminal court .... "Id. at 6-7 (Introduction); accord, id. § 1.1(C) commentary.
"Id. at 7.
"There are other divergences of less significance. The standards express a preference for
a three-year limitation on all juvenile court dispositions, id. § 1.2(A), rather than the
customary granting of dispositional authority until the juvenile reaches a certain age. One
reason offered for preferring a definite term is that such a provision reduces the desirabili-
ty of transfer when a juvenile near the maximum age for disposition appears before the
juvenile court. Id. commentary.
The Indiana Juvenile Code follows the customary rule, allowing dispositional jurisdic-
tion over an adjudicated delinquent only until age 21. IND. CODE § 31-6-2-3(Cum. Supp.
1979); see also IND. CODE §§ 11-1-2-10, 11-4-5-5 (1976). Accordingly, a person 20 years old
charged with having committed a crime the day before his 18th birthday would be subject
to the juvenile court's dispositional jurisdiction only for the time between his adjudication
as a delinquent and his 21st birthday; the temptation to transfer such a person to criminal
court would be substantial.
Another divergence between the standards and the Code concerns the applicability of
the statute of limitations. The transfer standards advocate a different statute of limita-
tions for juveniles, TRANSFER STANDARDS § 1.3, in part to avoid the problem of the older
juvenile, who because of his age is a prime candidate for transfer. Id. commentary. The In-
diana Juvenile Code, however, makes no provision with regard to the statute of limita-
tions, thus adopting the limitations rules applicable in criminal court. See IND. CODE
§ 31-6-4-1(a)(1)(Cum. Supp. 1979) (defining as delinquent any "act that would be a crime if
committed by an adult").
1979]
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at the time of the alleged crime;20 (2) there must be probable cause to
believe that the juvenile has committed a crime punishable by more than
twenty years' imprisonment;" and (3) there must be "clear and con-
vincing evidence [that] the juvenile is not a proper person to be handled
by the juvenile court. ' 22 This third determination itself requires four
separate findings: (A) that the alleged offense was a serious one;2 3 (B) that
the juvenile has a prior record of offenses involving significant bodily in-
jury;24 (C) the likely inefficacy of available juvenile dispositions, as
evidenced by prior dispositions; 25 and (D) the superiority of the disposi-
tional alternatives available in criminal court.2 6 Under the standards,
failure to meet any one of these requirements bars transfer to criminal
court.
The Indiana Juvenile Code creates far fewer substantive obstacles to
transfer. A prosecutor27 can seek transfer to criminal court under any of
three provisions. If the charge against the juvenile is murder, transfer is
required upon determinations that the juvenile was ten years old or older
at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, that there is probable
cause to believe the juvenile committed the crime, and that treating the
juvenile as an adult "would be in the best interests... of the safety and
welfare of the community. ' 28 If the crime charged is not murder, but a
Class A or B felony,29 the juvenile court should transfer if the juvenile
was sixteen or seventeen years of age at the time of the crime, if probable
cause to believe that the child committed the act is found, and if transfer
20 TRANSFER STANDARDS § 1.1(C).
21k1 § 2.2(A). The standard requires probable cause to believe the juvenile has committed
a "class one juvenile offense," which is elsewhere defined as a "criminal [offense] for which
the maximum sentence for adults would be death or imprisonment for life or a term in ex-
cess of twenty years." Id § 2.2(B) commentary.22
TRANSFER STANDARDS § 2.2(A)(2).
231d § 2.2(C)(1). The commentary specifically contemplates that some offenses
punishable by more than 20 years' imprisonment-as, until recently, possession of mari-
juana was in some jurisdictions-will not be viewed as serious. Id commentary, at 39.
241d § 2.2(C)(2).
25SJd § 2.2(C)(3).
261d § 2.2(C)(4).
"Both the Indiana Juvenile Code, IND. CODE § 31-6-2-4(b) to -4(d)(Cum. Supp. 1979), and
the transfer standards, TRANSFER STANDARDS § 2.1(C), allow only the prosecutor to initiate
the transfer process.
HIND. CODE § 31-6-2-4(c)(Cum. Supp. 1979). The statute states the "best interests" test in
the negative: the court should transfer, unless staying in juvenile court is in the best in-
terests of the community. The statute also requires that staying in juvenile court be "in
the best interests of the child," but this is true in virtually every case. Id
"Class A felonies are punishable by imprisonment "for a fixed term of thirty (30) years
with not more than twenty (20) years added for aggravating circumstances or not more
than ten (10) years subtracted for mitigating circumstances," IND. CODE § 35-50-2-4 (Cum.
Supp. 1979); Class B felonies are punishable "for a fixed term of ten (10) years, with not
more than ten (10) years added for aggravating circumstances or not more than four (4)
years subtracted for mitigating circumstances." Id § 35-50-2-5. Class A or B felonies
specified in IND. CODE § 35-48-4 (entitled: Offenses Relating to Controlled Substances) can-
not be the basis for transfer under this provision. IND. CODE § 31-6-2-4(d)(1)(Cum. Supp.
1979).
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is "in the best interests... of the safety and welfare of the communi-
ty . . .30
A prosecutor unable to obtain transfer under either of these two provi-
sions has a third option under the Code. The juvenile court may31 transfer
a child charged with any act that is "heinous or aggravated" or "part of a
repetitive pattern,""2 provided the court first finds that the juvenile was
fourteen or older at the time of the alleged commission, that there is prob-
able cause to believe the child committed the crime, that trial as an adult
"is in the best interests of the safety and welfare of the commuiity," and
that the child is "beyond rehabilitation under the juvenile justice
system. '33
The differences between these provisions and the transfer standards
are evident. Under the Indiana Juvenile Code, transfers of fourteen and
fifteen-year-olds to criminal court will frequently occur,34 while the stan-
dards recommend transferring only those sixteen or older.35 Furthermore,
any crime-apparently even a misdemeanor-can be transferred to
criminal court under the Indiana Juvenile Code;36 in contrast, the transfer
standards require that the crime charged carry a possible sentence of
more than twenty years before transfer is even possible.3 7
While the Code and the standards apply similar probable cause tests, 38
their tests for judging the propriety of juvenile court treatment are
definitely at odds. The propriety test articulated by the transfer stan-
dards 9 focuses entirely on the juvenile and his relationship to the
'
0 JUVENILE CODE § 31-6-2-4(d). But for the age and offense specifications, subsection (d)
tracks the language of subsection (c).3 1This transfer provision uses permissive language-"the juvenile court may waive
jurisdiction," id. § 31-6-2-4(b)-while the other transfer provisions are mandatory: "the
juvenile court shall waive jurisdiction." Id- § 31-6-2-4(c), -4(d). The apparent significance is
that a decision not to transfer under the mandatorily phrased provision is subject to
challenge in the same way that a decision to transfer could be challenged, while a no-
transfer decision under the permissive language is objectionable only as an abuse of discre-
tion. Cf. TRANSFER STANDARDS § 2.2(C) commentary, at 37-41 (transfer permitted but not
required).
"IND. CODE § 31-6-2-4(b)(1)(Cum. Supp. 1979). In judging whether an alleged crime is
heinous or aggravated, "greater weight [should be] given to acts against the person than
against property." Id § 31-6-2-4(b)(1).
3IdL § 31-6-2-4(b).
3
'See text accompanying notes 28-33 supra. While the murder prosecution of a child even
younger than 14 could also occur, see text accompanying note 28 supra, such an event
seems inconceivable.
31See text accompanying note 20 supra.
"See text accompanying notes 28-33 supra. If the misdemeanor charged is heinous or ag-
gravated or part of a repetitive pattern, transfer is possible. IND. CODE § 31-6-2-4(b)(Cum.
Supp. 1979).
31See text accompanying note 21 supra.
3 There is, however, one difference worth noting in the use of the Code's and the stand-
ards' probable cause tests. The Indiana Juvenile Code allows the criminal court receiving
the transferred juvenile to rely on the probable cause determination made at the transfer
hearing. IND. CODE § 31-6-2-4(g)(Cum. Supp. 1979). The standards reject this substitution,
requiring a separate determination of probable cause in the criminal court. TRANSFER
STANDARDS § 2.2(D). This is primarily because of its value to the defendant as a discovery
device. Id. § 2.2(D) commentary.
"See text accompanying notes 22-26 supra.
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juvenile court system. The fundamental inquiry appears to be whether
the child can still benefit from the special treatment available in that
system. °
The Indiana Juvenile Code, on the other hand, gives more attention to
the interests of the public than to the condition of the juvenile. When a
juvenile is charged with a major felony, the only important question to be
answered at the transfer hearing is, what do the safety and welfare of the
community require?" Only when the crime charged is less than a major
felony is it appropriate to inquire into the juvenile's capacity for
rehabilitation. 42
This emphasis on the public interest in criminal prosecution is not new:
for years, many states have allowed courts to consider the public interest
when determining transfer.43 It is disheartening that states have main-
tained this allowance even in the face of the Juvenile Justice Standards
Project's vigorous criticism of it.
According to the transfer standards, the problem with weighing the
public interest is that it diverts attention away from the juvenile, to the
desires of the community:
The presumption in favor of juvenile court jurisdiction re-
quires that the juvenile "deserve" [transfer. Transfer] must be
justified on the basis of the juvenile and his or her actions and
personal history. A "public interest" basis for [transfer] looks
to something external to the juvenile. To the extent that the
public interest means political considerations, these standards
reject such considerations as a proper element in the [transfer]
decision .... 44
A judicial decision to transfer a juvenile to criminal court because a
criminal conviction would assure the safety of frightened citizens, or set a
good example for the community, or satisfy the public desire for revenge,
is an inappropriate use of the juvenile justice system. A court should
transfer only when the child's situation shows that juvenile court treat-
4°The commentary to the standards indicates that the propriety test identifies persons
not "amenable to treatment" in the juvenile court. TRANSFER STANDARDS § 2.2(C) commen-
tary. For those unwilling to accept the rehabilitative ideal presupposed by talk of
"amenability" and "treatment," the commentary offers other rationales for the test. Id.
However, the language of section 2.2(C) -not a proper person to be handled by the juvenile
court- evidences that section's primary concern with the juvenile's amenability to treat-
ment as a child. Id.
"See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
"See text accompanying notes 31-33 supra. While it at least directs the court's attention
to the proper question, the "beyond rehabilitation" test is fatally deficient in that it does
not specify the minimum showing necessary to find that a juvenile is beyond rehabilita-
tion. See IND. CODE § 31-6-2-4(b)(4)(Cum. Supp. 1979); cf. TRANSFER STANDARDS § 2.2(C)
(elaborating the propriety test into four specific requirements).
"3The commentary to the transfer standards counts 27 states which permit a judge
making a transfer decision to assess the public interest in that decision. Id. § 2.2(C) com-
mentary.
"4Id
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ment is no longer proper.
Despite the vehemence of this attack, states continue to include the
public interest as a consideration in transfer. Indiana is the sixth state to
revise significant portions of its transfer statute after promulgation of
the standards without accepting the standards' recommendation to
disregard the public interest in criminal prosecution. 5 Perhaps this trend
is not surprising; after all, legislatures are designed to respond to
"political considerations," which makes them likely to devise other
governmental processes attuned to those same considerations. Yet those
concerned about juvenile justice still hope for something better.46
Besides recommending substantive obstacles to transfer, the Juvenile
Justice Standards Project also advocates giving the juvenile various pro-
cedural rights with which to oppose transfer. Strict time requirements
are established: a prosecutorial decision to seek transfer must be made no
more than seven days after a petition alleging delinquency is filed, a
transfer hearing must be held within another ten days, and a judicial de-
cision must be reached not more than ten days after the hearing.47 As a
further spur to resolution of the transfer question, the standards recom-
mend that the transfer decision be immediately appealable. 48 Thus, if
prosecutorial or judicial delay does not end the transfer dispute, ap-
pellate review will.
The Indiana Juvenile Code provides some, but certainly not all, of
these procedural rights to the juvenile. A transfer hearing must be held
within twenty days of the filing of the petition if the juvenile is in custody
and within sixty days, if he is not. 9 The Code establishes no other time
requirements with regard to transfer. Furthermore, the Juvenile Code
allows an appeal only from a final order,50 and a transfer decision is not a
final order. As the commentary to the transfer standards indicates, the
failure to allow an immediate appeal can delay effective review of a
transfer decision for years, if not forever.51
'See GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2501(a)(3) (Supp. 1978); IDAHO CODE § 16-1806(8) (Supp. 1978);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7(3)(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §
26-11-4 (Supp. 1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.110(2) (Supp. 1977).
The action of the Georgia legislature is particularly striking. In 1978, that legislature
removed from its transfer statute a provision conditioning transfer on a finding that the
juvenile was not amenable to treatment as a child. This of course is the test which the
transfer standards had specifically advocated in 1977.
"Crowning the defects in the Code's reliance on the public interest in criminal prosecu-
tion is the fact that such interest need only be shown by a preponderance of the evidence.
IND. CODE § 31-6-7-13(a)(Cum. Supp. 1979). The standards would require the state to show
the impropriety of juvenile court treatment by clear and convincing evidence. TRANSFER
STANDARDS § 2.2(C).
47TRANSFER STANDARDS § 2.1(C)-2.1(E).
18d1 § 2.4(A). The appeal must be taken no later than seven days after the juvenile judge
renders decision. Id.
4'IND. CODE § 31-6-7-6(b)(Cum. Supp. 1979).
"See i&L § 31-6-7-17. [Shortly before publication, the restrictive "final order" language
was deleted by An Act to Amend IC 33-5-10, and IC 35-46-1 Concerning Juvenile Law,
Pub. L. No. 276, § 47, 1979 Ind. Acts -. ED.]
"TRANSFER STANDARDS § 2.4(A) commentary.
1979]
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In addition to the rights to a speedy transfer decision and to an im-
mediate appeal, the Juvenile Justice Standards Project also advocates a
full set of procedural rights exercisable by the juvenile at the transfer
hearing. The juvenile should have counsel at the hearing, and an indigent
juvenile should have counsel at state expense.52 The burden of going for-
ward should be on the prosecutor, with the juvenile having the right to
respond.5 3 The juvenile's rights to confront the witnesses against him
and to remain silent should be observed.5 4 As part of the right to remain
silent, the juvenile also should have the right to control the use of his
statements: in order to encourage candor at the transfer hearing, the
juvenile should be able to bar any subsequent use of his statements at
that hearing.55
Finally, the transfer standards contemplate that the prosecution will
use expert opinion to prove the impropriety of treating the juvenile as a
child. Accordingly, the standards grant the juvenile the rights to ques-
tion any such expert, to inspect all data on which the expert bases his
opinion, and to call an expert witness (at state expense if the juvenile is
indigent) to refute the testimony of the prosecution's expert.5 6
Once again, the Indiana Juvenile Code grants some, but not all, of
these procedural rights. At a transfer hearing, the juvenile has a right to
legal representation, which will be provided to any juvenile unable to af-
ford such representation.58 The juvenile also has the rights to cross-
examine the prosecution's witnesses and to call witnesses of his own, as
well as the right not to be a witness against himself. 9 However, the Code
does not grant any protection to statements made by the juvenile at the
transfer hearing. As a result, a juvenile who offers his own testimony to
show that he is not "beyond rehabilitation" 60 runs the risk that the pros-
ecutor will subsequently use that testimony against him.
In addition to the risk thrust upon the juvenile at the hearing, the
Indiana Juvenile Code does not contain special provisions with regard to
the use of expert opinion in the transfer process. This is understandable
since the Code does not contemplate that such opinion will be necessary
5 2 M § 2.3(A), 2.3(B).
5sal- § 2.3(E), 2.3(F).
54ld. § 2.3(H), 2.3(I).
11Id § 2.3(I) commentary. Thus, a juvenile can confess at the transfer hearing, in an at-
tempt to show that he still can benefit from juvenile court treatment, without running the
risk that the confession will convict him after he is transferred to criminal court.
"I& § 2.3(C), 2.3(D), 2.3(G).
"
7IND. CODE § 31-6-3-1(b)(Cum. Supp. 1979). This right to counsel may be waived by a
juvenile and a parent 'with no interest adverse to the child" if they both act "knowingly
and voluntarily" after "meaningful consultation." ICL § 31-6-7-3(a). The transfer standards,
in contrast, do not allow waiver of the right to counsel. TRANSFER STANDARDS § 2.3(A) com-
mentary.
5 IND. CODE § 31-6-7-2(a)(Cum. Supp. 1979). A financially capable parent can be held
responsible for the costs of counsel appointed for his child. Id- §§ 31-6-4-18(b), 31-6-7-2(c).
5MId. § 31-6-3-1.
6 See text accompanying notes 31-33 supra.
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to a determination of transfer.61 It is evident that expert testimony is ir-
relevant in establishing the juvenile's age and the crime alleged, in deter-
mining probable cause and in weighing the best interests of the communi-
ty. However, when the prosecution must also show that the juvenile is
"beyond rehabilitation, 6 2 expert opinion seems highly important. Yet, if
the prosecutor plans to use such evidence, the juvenile has only limited
methods for discovering the expert's planned testimony63 and only his
own resources to support a search for contradictory expert opinion.64
The foregoing comparison exposes some significant defects in the
Indiana Juvenile Code's transfer provisions. These defects should be
remedied by amendment. Indiana juveniles under sixteen should not be
eligible for transfer, nor should any juvenile charged with a crime other
than a major felony.6 Furthermore, the court determining transfer
should not consider the public interest in criminal prosecution, but rather
should evaluate the juvenile's amenability to the treatment available in
the juvenile court.66 With regard to procedure, the most important
changes necessary are provisions (1) making transfer orders immediately
appealable;67 (2) protecting the juvenile's statements at the transfer
hearing;68 and (3) offering an indigent juvenile the services of an expert
witness to contest the amenability-to-treatment issue.69 These amend-
"Such opinion is necessary prior to disposition, and the juvenile court can obtain it after
adjudication by requesting a predisposition report. IND. CODE § 31-6-4-15(a)(Cum. Supp.
1979). The juvenile's access to a predisposition report can be limited. I.T 31-6-4-15(f).
"2See text accompanying notes 31-33 supra.
"The law of discovery in criminal cases applies to delinquency cases, including transfer
hearings. IND. CODE § 31-6-7-11(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
"One further difference in procedural rights exists. The standards permit the juvenile to
disqualify the hearing judge from presiding at the subsequent proceeding, whether
juvenile or criminal. TRANSFER STANDARDS § 2.3(J). Under the Code, a judge can be dis-
qualified only "for good cause shown." IND. CODE § 31-6-7-9 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
"Amendment of INDIANA CODE § 31-6-2-4 will produce the desired results. Subsections
(b) and (c) should be deleted. See text accompanying notes 27-28, 31-33 supra; murder
should be added to the list of crimes justifying transfer under subsection (d). See text ac-
companying notes 29-30 supra. [Shortly before publication murder wvas added to the list of
crimes in subsection (d). The amendment failed to delete subsections (b) and (c). An Act to
Amend IC 33-46-1 Concerning Juvenile Law, Pub. L. No. 276, § 6, 1979 Ind. Acts . ED.]
"Accordingly, the General Assembly should remove from § 31-6-2-4 all reference to the
"best interests ... of the community." See text accompanying notes 28, 30, 33 suprm That
consideration should be replaced with the "beyond rehabilitation" test. See text accompa-
nying note 33 supra The amending legislation should particularize the meaning of
"beyond rehabilitation." See note 42 supra.
67IND. CODE § 31-6-2-4(Cum. Supp. 1979), the transfer statute, can be so amended or the
legislature could add to § 31-6-7-17, the appeals statute, an indication that a transfer deci-
sion is a final order and thus subject to appeal [See note 50 supra. ED.].
"Such a provision should be included in the transfer statute, § 31-6-2-4, with an explana-
tion of the relationship of this new provision to § 31-6-7-3(c) ("knowing and voluntary"
statements which are nevertheless inadmissible against a juvenile can be used to impeach
the juvenile's subsequent testimony). The standards recommend against this use of the
juvenile's transfer hearing statements. TRANSFER STANDARDS § 2.3(I).
"While the General Assembly could add such a provision to the transfer statute, §
31-6-2-4, a better location would be § 31-6-7-2, which now deals with the appointment of
counsel for indigents in juvenile court.
1979]
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ments would greatly improve the transfer process in Indiana by causing
that process to resemble more clearly the model envisioned by the
Juvenile Justice Standards Project.
POST-TRANSFER STATUS OF A PRE-TRANSFER CONFESSION
There is an important issue which the transfer standards do not ad-
dress: the effect of transfer from juvenile to criminal court on the use,
after transfer, of a juvenile's statements made prior to the transfer
hearing. The standards do protect the juvenile's admissions at the
hearing itself,70 but they are silent with regard to previous statements by
the child.
The reasoning which motivates a juvenile to incriminate himself at the
transfer hearing is that candidly admitting one's past misconduct helps
to convince the court that rehabilitation is still possible and transfer
therefore improper.71 This same reasoning applies from the very moment
the juvenile is taken into custody. Openness and contrition can win
leniency from the police, from the juvenile court intake officer, or from
the prosecutor, each of whom can act to forestall transfer.7 2 The juvenile
who incriminates himself for this reason runs the risk that he will not per-
suade any of the relevant officials, and thus will find himself in criminal
court where his candor will be powerful evidence against him. Once in
criminal court, the previously candid juvenile can only seek to suppress
his confession on the grounds available to all criminal defendants. 738 But
should his status as a juvenile at the time of the admissions provide any
other basis for excluding them as evidence against him?
Indiana law does not currently provide an answer to this question.
While the Supreme Court of Indiana has dealt repeatedly with the
general problem of juvenile confessions,74 no attention has been given to
70TRANSFER STANDARDS § 2.3(I). See text accompanying note 55 supra
71See id § 2.3(I) commentary.
72For example, under the Indiana Juvenile Code a policeman has implicit discretionary
authority not to take a juvenile into custody and not to report his crime to the juvenile
court intake officer. IND. CODE §§ 31-6-4-4(b), 31-6-4-7(a)(Cum. Supp. 1979). While the intake
officer must report all allegations of crime to the prosecutor, he can recommend informal
adjustment to the prosecutor. Id- § 31-6-4-7(d). Even if both the arresting and intake of-
ficers recommend transfer, the prosecutor has discretion not to seek transfer and even not
to file a petition alleging delinquency. Id §§ 31-6-2-4, 31-6-4-9(a).
"3Any involuntary statement of a defendant will be suppressed; involuntariness is
judged on a totality-of-the-circumstances basis, with age an important circumstance. See,
e.g., Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962) (confession of 14 year-old held incom-
municado for five days involuntary); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (confession of 15
year-old after interrogation from 12:00 midnight to 5:00 a.m. involuntary). A criminal
defendant can also seek exclusion because his interrogators violated one of the rules enun-
ciated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201 (1964).
'In Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 431, 288 N.E.2d 138 (1972), the state supreme court held
that a juvenile could not waive his rights to counsel and to remain silent until both he and a
parent had been informed of these rights and had consulted about their waiver. Id at 439,
288 N.E.2d at 142. The court grounded this holding on the need for "[c]learly defined pro-
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this particular facet of that problem. Nor does the Indiana Juvenile Code
speak to the issue.
75
Other jurisdictions have spoken, however. The first, and certainly most
provocative, answer to the question posed by pre-transfer confessions
came from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia. In 1961, in Harling v. United States, 76 that court held that a
juvenile's responses to interrogation prior to transfer were not under any
circumstances admissible against him in the subsequent criminal trial. 7
Recognizing that "principles of 'fundamental fairness' govern... pro-
cedures" in the juvenile court, the District of Columbia Circuit explained
that "[i]t would offend these principles to allow admissions made by the
child in the non-criminal and non-punitive setting of juvenile proceedings
to be used later for the purpose of securing his criminal conviction and
punishment. '7
8
This total ban on post-transfer use of a pre-transfer confession was
highly controversial;79 the controversy ultimately produced a statute in
the District of Columbia circumventing the Harling rule in major pros-
ecutions. 0 Nevertheless, Harling became the rallying cry of transferred
juveniles, as court after court was asked to adopt a similar rule.
The courts' responses were almost universally negative. The most
favorable reaction came in Arizona where the state supreme court
adopted a modified Harling rule in 1967, only to abandon it in 1971. In
State v. Maloney,81 the 1967 case, the Arizona court cited Harling ap-
provingly but refused to accept Harling's complete ban on the use of pre-
transfer confessions as criminal evidence; rather, the court required that,
prior to questioning the juvenile, the police warn him (and his parents) of
the possibility of transfer.82 Just four years later, however, the Arizona
Supreme Court overruled Maloney, permitting admission into evidence
cedures" in this "area of doubt and confusion." f& at 436, 288 N.E.2d at 141. See also
Stone v. State, -Ind.-, 377 N.E.2d 1372 (1978); Garrett v. State, 265 Ind. 63, 351
N.E.2d 30 (1976); Hall v. State, 264 Ind. 448, 346 N.E.2d 584 (1976).75JUVENILE CODE § 31-6-7-3(a), (d) simply codify the Lewis rule and the voluntariness test,
respectively. See notes 73-74 supra. .
76295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
"Id. at 164.
78II at 163.
"See Harrison v. United States, 359 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (reaffirming Harling by a
vote of six to four).
89D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 16-230 (West 1973) (removing from juvenile court jurisdiction
children 16 or older charged with murder, rape, burglary, or armed robbery).
8t102 Ariz. 495, 433 P.2d 625 (1967).
821d. at 499, 433 P.2d at 629. Besides relying on Harling, the Maloney court also justified
its warning requirement by citing an Arizona statute to the effect that "evidence given in
the juvenile court shall not be admissible as evidence against the child in any proceeding in
another court." Id. at 498, 433 P.2d at 628 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-228(B) (1955);
current version id. § 8-207 (1970)). While an expansive construction of "evidence given in
the juvenile court" might justify Harling's total ban on pre-transfer confessions, it is dif-
ficult to see how any interpretation of this language could support Maloney's warning re-
quirement.
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in a criminal trial a juvenile's confession obtained without any warning of
the possibility of transfer.83
Other state courts were less roundabout in their rejection of Harling.
In California,84 Florida, 5 Illinois, 8 6 Nebraska,87 and New Mexico, 88 state
supreme courts explicitly refused to follow the lead of the District of
Columbia Circuit Court. Instead, these courts judged only whether the
juvenile's pre-transfer confession was voluntary, as indicated by the
totality of the confession's circumstances. 9 The fact that the child was
still within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court at the time of his state-
ment was merely one of those circumstances. Without mentioning the
Harling rule, courts in another seven states also showed their unwill-
ingness to adopt any test specifically designed to deal with criminal court
use of a juvenile's confession.
As an extreme solution, the involuntariness standard surpasses the
Harling rule: the latter may overly restrict the use of a pre-transfer con-
fession, but the former is definitely far too permissive.9 1 Since 1966,
courts in a few jurisdictions have developed a compromise between these
two extremes.
State v. Gullings,"2 a 1966 decision of the Oregon Supreme Court, in-
volved a juvenile arrested for burglary, who was immediately informed of
his rights and of the fact that the state could use anything he said in a
"criminal prosecution" against him.9 3 After Gullings confessed, the
juvenile court transferred him to criminal court, where he urged adoption
of the Harling rule. The state supreme court accepted the reasoning
underlying Harling's total ban on pre-transfer confessions, but concluded
"that an absolute prohibition is not required so long as it is made clear to
"State v. Hardy, 107 Ariz. 583, 491 P.2d 17 (1971) (16 year-old accused of arson and 28
counts of murder). The court cited Rule 18 of the Arizona Rules of Procedure of the
Juvenile Court as authority for overruling Maloney, noting that the conditions for admit-
ting confessions in juvenile court proceedings did not include a warning of the possibility
of transfer. Id. at 584, 491 P.2d at 17-18. Because it relates only to juvenile proceedings,
the rule seems irrelevant to the issue faced in Maloney.
"People v. Lara, 67 Cal. 2d 365, 432 P.2d 202, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1967).
"State v. Francois, 197 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 1967).
"People v. Prude, 66 Ili. 2d 470, 363 N.E.2d 371 (1977).
"State v. Stewart, 197 Neb. 497, 250 N.W.2d 849 (1977).
"State v. Ortega, 77 N.M. 7, 419 P.2d 219 (1966).
8See note 73 supra.
"See State v. Oliver, 160 Conn. 85, 273 A.2d 867 (1970); Crawford v. State, 240 Ga. 321,
240 S.E.2d 824 (1977); State v. Cross, 223 Kan. 803, 576 P.2d 698 (1978); Hayden v. Com-
monwealth, 563 S.W.2d 720 (Ky. 1978); State v. Dawson, 278 N.C. 351, 180 S.E.2d 140
(1971); Braziel v. State, 529 S.W.2d 501 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975); Mullin v. State, 505 P.2d
305 (Wyo. 1973). Most of these cases reject the argument that a juvenile cannot confess
unless a parent or counsel is present; the fact that the juvenile confessed alone is just one
of the factors to be considered.
9E.g., In People v. Lara, the court found voluntary the confession of an indigent, poorly
education Mexican-American juvenile interrogated while suffering from "lack of sleep and
excessive drinking." 67 Cal. 2d at 326, 432 P.2d at 210, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
92244 Or. 173, 416 P.2d 311 (1966).
"Id. at 175. 416 P.2d at 312.
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the juvenile that criminal responsibility can result and that the ques-
tioning authorities are not operating as his friends but as his
adversaries." 94 Based on the arresting officer's warning and Gullings'
failure to introduce any evidence showing that he did not understand his
jeopardy,95 the court affirmed the conviction.
The Gullings test differs significantly from the involuntariness stan-
dard. Rather than surveying all the circumstances of a pre-transfer con-
fession, the Gullings test focuses on whether the juvenile knew transfer
was possible and whether he knew his interrogators had more in mind
than his rehabilitation. If these two circumstances are not present, no
amount of voluntariness, as shown by other factors, can render the con-
fession admissible.98 Iowa,97 Minnesota, 98 Missouri,99 and Washington 100
have all adopted versions of the Gullings test. 1
In addition to these states, a few more appear likely to follow Gullings
when an appropriate case arises. They are jurisdictions which have
already shown their willingness to require more of a juvenile confession
than that it simply be voluntary. Courts in these states also require the
presence of a lawyer or a parent and an opportunity for the juvenile to
consult with this adult. Indiana is one of these states.102
Thus, it seems likely that the Indiana courts will adopt the Gullings
test without legislative prodding. A court willing to bar otherwise volun-
tary juvenile confessions, because no sympathetic adult was present,
quite probably will also feel hostile to confessions obtained from a
juvenile unaware of the possibility of transfer or of the true intent of his
questioners.
The Indiana courts should take this step.0 ' Adopting Gullings will pro-
tect the juvenile when he (and the sympathetic adult present) are either
gullible enough to disregard the possibility of transfer or unaware of the
possibility of transfer. However, the Gullings test will do nothing to aid
the juvenile, fully aware of the possibility of transfer, who nevertheless
911d. at 178-79, 416 P.2d at 313.
SId. at 179-82, 416 P.2d at 313-15.
96The rule adopted in Gullings is both more and less than a warning requirement like
Maloney's. See text accompanying notes 81-83 supra. The Gullings test is more because it
requires actual comprehension of the situation, rather than just the routine delivery of a
form of words. It is less, because such comprehension can be proved even when there has
been no warning.
"State v. Allen, 224 N.W.2d 237 (Iowa 1974).
"State v. Loyd, 297 Minn. 442, 212 N.W.2d 671 (1973).
"State v. Wright, 515 S.W.2d 421 (Mo. 1974).
"'0State v. Prater, 77 Wash. 2d 526, 463 P.2d 640 (1970).
"'1Two other states, Virginia and Wisconsin, appear to follow Gullings, although the ex-
tent of their fidelity is unclear. Harris v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 715, 232 S.E.2d 751
(1977); Theriault v. State, 66 Wis. 2d 33, 223 N.W.2d 850 (1974).
"'See note 74 supra. The other states are Louisiana and Pennsylvania. See State ex rel.
Dino, 359 So. 2d 586 (La. 1978); Commonwealth v. Harvell, 473 Pa. 418, 374 A.2d 1282
(1977).
"'If the courts fail to adopt the Gullings test, the General Assembly should, by adding a
new provision to IND. CODE § 31-6-7-3(Cum. Supp. 1979).
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decides to be forthcoming, in order to convince the authorities that he
should not be transferred. Should the legislature1 0 4 grant any additional
protection to a juvenile in this situation?
In answering this question, it should be remembered that the state has
an interest in encouraging the juvenile to behave in this way. Open
acknowledgment of one's past conduct and of its wrongfulness is the first
step toward rehabilitation. 1 5 Given the rehabilitative goals of the
juvenile court, young offenders in particular should be given every oppor-
tunity to take this step. Yet the possibilities of transfer and of the post-
transfer use of pre-transfer statements combine to discourage the
juvenile from being candid. Even the child initially inclined to confess
thinks twice before doing so, and the silence that frequently follows such
thought becomes a major obstacle to rehabilitation. 10 6
For these reasons, the General Assembly should act to encourage a
juvenile's candor even when transfer is a possibility. One means of ac-
complishing this would be legislative adoption of a Harling-like ban on
the admission in criminal court of pre-transfer confessions. North Dakota
has such a provision in its transfer statute: "Statements made by the
child after being taken into custody and prior to... the service of notice
[of a transfer hearing] are not admissible against him over objection in
the criminal proceedings following the transfer.9
1 0 7
1'0 4Given the judicial reception of Harling, see text accompanying notes 79-80 supra, the
Gullings test is the most protection a court can provide without additional legislative
direction. Therefore, if there is to be a supplement to this test, the legislature must enact
it.
i 5Cf. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970): An adult defendant who pleads
guilty "demonstrates by his plea that he is ready and willing to admit his crime and to
enter the corre*ctional system in a frame of mind that affords hope for success in rehabilita-
tion over a shorter period of time.than might otherwise be necessary."
'"Chief Justice Weintraub of the Supreme Court of New Jersey wrote in In re Carlo, 48
N.J. 224, 244, 225 A.2d 110, 121 (1966) (concurring opinion):
The object of the juvenile process is to make men out of errant boys. In that
process we must build upon the truth. A juvenile should be led to believe the
decent thing is to come clean, to face the music. A father, inquiring as to
possible misconduct of his son, would feel a bit absurd if he told the son...
that he has a right not to answer .... That scene would be absurd for a couple
of reasons, and one is that that is no way to teach integrity.
Chief Justice Weintraub was arguing against recognition of a juvenile's right to silence, a
position discredited by In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). However, Weintraub's goal of
"teach[ing] integrity" is not inconsistent with the juvenile's right to silence. See Kastigar
v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) (authorities may compel testimony if its subsequent
use is barred).
"'N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34(4) (Supp. 1977). If the General Assembly chooses to
emulate the North Dakota example, it should make its intentions clear, because some
courts have been hesitant to believe that legislators would embrace a Harling-like rule. In
United States v. Spruille, 544 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. J976), the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals could not believe that Congress had adopted a total ban on post-transfer use of pre-
transfer confessions. Id at 305-07. Other circuit courts of appeals have come to the same
conclusion. United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Cheyenne,
558 F.2d 902 (8th Cir. 1977). This conclusion was reached despite the plain language of
Congress that "[sitatements made by a juvenile prior to... a transfer hearing... shall not
be admissible at subsequent criminal prosecutions." 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1976).
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Such a statute would raise all the controversy and criticism which
Harling generated. To avoid this, the General Assembly might choose to
bar from criminal court only those pre-transfer statements made to
juvenile court personnel. In 1973, Alabama had a statute of this sort,
which provided: "No... admission or confession of [an alleged delin-
quent] to the probation officer or court... shall be given or heard in any
... criminal... proceeding whatever ....
A similar statutory provision under the Indiana Juvenile Code would
bar the admission in criminal court of any pre-transfer statement made in
the presence of the juvenile court intake officer,109 the prosecutor,110 or the
juvenile judge."' Such a provision, in combination with a legislatively or
judicially adopted Gullings test, would allow limited interrogation by the
police to obtain evidence usable in any court, while still providing the
juvenile a protected opportunity to demonstrate his amenability to treat-
ment as a child. The juvenile would thus have a choice between con-
fessing completely, confessing to the juvenile court only, and not con-
fessing at all. Offering the juvenile such a choice would be a sensible en-
couragement of candor, and an amendment to that effect would
measurably improve the Indiana Juvenile Code.
1'0ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 377 (1940) (superseded by ALA. CODE § 12-15-67 (1975)). For an in-
terpretation of the prior statute, see Clarke v. State, 51 Ala. App. 222, 283 So. 2d 671
(1973), cert denied, 292 Ala. 716, 289 So. 2d 808 (1974). The statute applicable in federal
juvenile proceedings, see note 107 supra, has been read to the same effect, protecting
"statements made by a juvenile to court related personnel in connection with a transfer
hearing." United States v. Spruille, 544 F.2d 303, 305 (7th Cir. 1976) (citing 18 U.S.C. §
5032 (1976)).
'"For a discussion of the intake officer's role in transfer, see note 72 supra.
"'Since convincing the prosecutor not to seek transfer will be important to many
juveniles, see note 72 supra, the Code should classify the prosecutor as part of the juvenile
court apparatus for the purposes of this provision.
"'The state legislature should combine any such provision with the previously recom-
mended prohibition on the post-transfer use of a juvenile's transfer hearing testimony, see
note 68 supra, placing both in IND. CODE § 31-6-2-4(Cum. Supp. 1979), the Code's transfer
statute.
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